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Source: Market Opinion Research data provided by MOR; Center for Political Studies data were calculated by the author; all other data were adapted from Public Opinion (1985) . In this table Democrats and Republicans are only those who are categorized as strong or weak identifiers. In all other tables leaning, weak, and strong identifiers are considered partisans. The treatment of leaning identifiers in this table was required by the published data, which defined leaning partisans as independents.
Prior to 1980 there was no discernible trend in the balance of Republican and Democratic identifiers. The Democratic lead shrank slightly under the pressures that produced strong Republican presidential victories such as Eisenhower's in 1956, only to grow when the Democrats enjoyed a strong balance of popular support for their candidate (e.g., 1964). Changes were occurring, but they produced no net shift in the partisan balance. The dealignment that reduced the percentage of Democrats and Republicans left the competitive balance between the parties almost unchanged. Since 1980, however, there appears to have been a substantial movement toward the Republicans. Some data (table 1) The decline was irregular. Surveys conducted during 1981 found a similar Republican tilt, which was quickly reversed by the recession of 1982 (figure 1). Hopeful Republicans insist that the post-1984 levels are permanent, but many interpret the changes as a "performance realignment" that will not persist beyond Reagan or a significant downturn in the economy (Sussman, 1985) . Others equivocate, but even some Democrats (pollster Peter Hart, for example) believe that at least some of the pro-Republican movement is rooted in policy preferences that are not likely to be undone by short-lived economic dislocations.3
Conversion and Persuasion
Whatever the future of this partisan shift, there is no evidence in table 2 that the current GOP success has depended upon volatile younger voters (but see Helmut Norpoth, 1985, for data which contradict this finding). While those who came of age prior to 1960 changed less than the post-1960 cohort, the erosion of Democratic partisanship occurred among all ages.4 Conversion has contributed more than the biased mobilization of younger cohorts to the recent surge in Republican identification. This result may not be permanent: As the strong pro-Republican sentiment of the moment recedes, older Democrats could return to their partisan habits while younger voters, whose political tendencies are less well-rooted, remain Republican (the rationale for this is developed in McPhee and Ferguson, 1962; Beck, 1974) . At present, however, all age groups have contributed to the declining Democratic plurality. 2 The connection between dealignment and realignment may be quite strong. It is possible that the early period of the transformation of a party system will be characterized by a general loosening of the partisan attachments of the electorate. This dealignment might persist until subsequent events facilitate the reestablishment of a stable equilibrium. The common expectation was that the dealignment of the 1970s would create a party politics marked by nonpartisanship and a peripheral electorate for the indefinite future. The apparently greater partisanship of young voters since 1980 and the southern realignment cast doubt on this prediction of a dealigned, peripheral electorate. It also suggests that there might be merit in examining the extent to which dealignment is a harbinger of realignment.
3 While others have since used the ideas of performance and policy realignment, I first heard this distinction from Frederick Steeper of Market Opinion Research, to whom I am indebted for it.
. The finding may also have substantive significance. This cohort averages about 56 years of age. It was also common during 1982 and 1983 to find that Reagan's lowest job approval was provided by voters in the 55 to 64 age group. The suspicion was that those voters, nearing retirement, were the most anxious over discussions of the administration's plans for the social security system. The retired segment of the electorate was, on balance, supportive of Reagan. That group knew that whatever the future might hold, the social security system had not reduced their benefits. Further, they did not believe that their benefits would be affected. Note: Table entries Yet, while the Democratic decline is not specific to certain age cohorts, it is not unstructured or undifferentiated. It is unequally distributed among ethnic groups and regions, and the older cohorts who appear to have changed their party identification are largely from certain segments of the electorate. This paper presents an analysis of these partisan changes in terms of the social groups which constitute the party coalitions. The first part presents the rationale for examining the social foundations of the American parties, while the second part uses this social-group model of the parties to describe their realignment. The third part of the paper considers recent elections (especially 1984) in terms of the still-underway realignment.5 5The 1984 NES survey seriously underrepresented men and white southerners. Since the analysis makes over-time comparisons of the groups in terms of their share of the parties, it was important to compensate for this sampling error by reweighting the sample so that it would conform to population parameters. 
Social Divisions and-Political Parties
Religious, economic, ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences provide the social "fault lines" which have been the most common source of social conflict. Parties have been the organized expression of these conflicts, and it contradicts none of the conventional ways of thinking about parties to view them as the traditional (although not the only) instruments of collective action with which groups promote and protect interests that are unmet by the social structure and markets. While the number, salience and centrality, and political significance of the cleavages vary among societies (in the U.S. and Great Britain social differences and political preference are weakly aligned; in Holland and Austria the link is strong), the existence of group differences, their politicization through ideological and policy disputes are virtual constants (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Dahl, 1966; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rose and Unwin, 1969).6 While programmatic differences among parties do not always reflect social group differences and conflicts, one is hard pressed to find instances where issue conflict is independent of social cleavages. Issue and ideology may be the language of party conflict, but group needs and conflicts are its source in modem party systems.
The importance of this conception of parties as, to quote Lipset and Rokkan (1967), "coalitions in conflict over policies and value commitments within the . . . body politic" is that it leads directly to a conception of realignments as reformulations of the "coalitions in conflict." The reformulation might be a product of massive changes in a group's party affiliation; it may reflect the development of a partisan cleavage within a new group in the society (immigrants, for example); it might also come about as a highly aligned group loses its partisan distinctiveness (a major component of coalition changes in the U.S. through the middle 1970s). The outcome in any of these cases-and many unmentioned possibilities-is a realignment of the parties and the electorate.7 6 The weaker alignment of social and party cleavages in the United States is at the root of several distinctive features of the American polity, among which we might include the frequency with which the American parties have realigned and rebuilt their popular foundations. As coalitions of often competing groups, incompatible policies and programs have occasionally divided coalition groups and sent one or more to the opposite party. Just as frequently, and perhaps with greater net effect, the programmatic orientation of the parties has allowed them to differentially mobilize new entrants into American Politics, The result of this coalition expansion is first a larger party, but also a coalition measurably more diverse and subject to internal differences that may precipitate subsequent realignments. 7 This straightforward definition of realignment is theoretically compatible with the coalitional (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) definition of parties, it corresponds to practitioners' perspectives on the electoral foundations of parties, and it is easily measured. It also provides purchase on related, problematic phenomena. It allows, for example, an ordering of realignments in terms of their magnitude. Some will be "critical" as Burnham (1970) has used the term, filled with consequences and secondary effects of many kinds; others will be more modest in their by-products. A few will yield a new majority and an alteration of the policy agenda of the society; others may produce only one of these changes. Some realignments will follow major social upheavals, while others will issue from more modest policy failures or intraparty divisions. Some realignments will depend upon a change in the party preference of several large groups, while others will reflect changes of one or a few small segments of the electorate. Some realignments will occur quickly, taking on the qualities of Key's "critical" election; still others will be long-term conflicts producing extended, "secular" realignments. Contemporary party system change in the United States is of the latter type. For more on this see chapter two of Petrocik (1981).
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 49,1987
The Politician's Model of the Electorate Practical politicians deal with groups of voters through the issues which they believe to be of concern to members of the group. When Democratic or Republican office-seekers "talk about the issues" and otherwise present a policy agenda to the electorate, they are soliciting support in several ways. But the central purpose of "dealing with the issues" is to rally groups which normally support the party's candidates. The candidates present themselves as faithful proponents of the interests of the groups which constitute the party coalitions. The "generic Democrat" talks about the social safety net, affirmative action, the need to maintain momentum against racial injustice, and the essential commitment to provide jobs and a decent standard of living to all Americans; the Republican opponent urges reductions in government waste, lower taxes, economic growth, strong opposition to a "predatory" Soviet Union, and a renewal of traditional values and institutions.
Through time and across elections, what the party stands for and the issues its candidates address reflect the preferences of the groups which constitute the core support of the party. Leaders innovate; issues beyond the concerns of their core constituency are placed by them on the party agenda. But over the long run, the programmatic face of the party arises from its constituency, and parties develop reputations for differential issue competence as a result of this constituency-based issue specialization (Budge and Farlie, 1983 ). Table numbers But that growth in Republican identification was not confined to new cohorts; older white southerners were also more Republican. The trend accelerated in the late 1970s. As table 7 shows, by 1984 the younger cohort of native white southerners was more Republican than Democratic, and the overwhelming (71% to 22%) Democratic allegiance of the pre-1960 cohort had declined to a more modest 52 to 39 percent. The older cohort contributed over 70% of the decline in Democratic identification and more than 80% of the increase in Republican partisanship. 13 The net effect of migrants is greater than the apparently modest 4-point difference because migrants have increased as a share of the white population of the south. Once less than 10;, they now number approximately 14% of the white population of the region.
THE REALIGNMENT OF THE COALITIONS
14 These over-time differences in the partisanship of migrants are small; it is possible that migrants were not a counter-trend during the 1980s; it is certain that they were an insignificant contributor to the decline in the partisanship of the region. (For more on this, see Petrocik, 1981, pp. 85-86. Thad Brown, 1987, also has relevant data on the political consequences of migration.) Wolfinger and Hagen (1985) argue that migration was a major component of partisan change in the South through the late 1970s. They do not present data that are sufficiently detailed to evaluate that claim. It is certainly contradicted by the NES data presented above, which they claim to have used in their analysis. Moreover, on their face the data seem unlikely to support such a conclusion. A combination of the magnitude of the southern white change and the small fraction migrants are of the total population simply would not allow migrants to be so consequential. Other than this discrepancy most of their analysis parallels findings in Petrocik (1981) and Beck (1977) . Note: Numbers in the last two columns do not sum to zero because of rounding errors. Leaning partisans are considered identifiers of the party toward which they lean. Net Change -25 +20 Note: Leaning partisans are considered identifiers of the party toward which they lean.
THE PROGRAMMATIC ALIGNMENT OF THE PARTIES
This coalitional shift has affected the programmatic distance between the parties on several issues. A complete analysis of the policy consequences of the realignment documented above demands a full treatment by itself (some analysis is presented in Petrocik, 1981), but a brief illustration of what these changes are likely to mean for policy divisions between the parties, especially with regard to race issues, is worthwhile. Consider the data in figure 2.
During the 1950s, Democrats and Republicans differed over questions of economic regulation and social welfare; they were indistinguishable on race issues. By 1984 not only had Democrats and Republicans become more distinctive on welfare questions, but the policy differences between the parties had acquired a racial dimension. While smaller than differences on welfare policy, party differences on race questions were large nonetheless. The realignment is responsible for a significant fraction of this greater programmatic distinctiveness. Catholics represent a target group for both parties; neither can depend upon them for a majority although the Democrats are stronger with both, especially union families. Democrats enjoyed overwhelming support from blacks, Jews, and Hispanics. Union members, reverting to an earlier Democratic affinity, gave less than 40% of their votes to Republicans, a decline that is more than an off-year sag. A comparison of their vote with their partisanship shows an eight-point shortfall. It seems likely that the vote among union members this year registered dissatisfaction with the Republicans.
The striking feature of table 11, given the media emphasis on Democratic success in the south, is the overwhelming Republican vote of white southerners. There is no evidence that southern whites have returned or are returning to their Democratic partisanship of an earlier era. On the contrary, all of the data indicate a continuation of their preference for the Republicans (although, to be sure, not always Republican candidates, especially at the local level). As a group they were at least as Republican as WASPs, the traditional Republican core constituency.
Why the Southern Republicans Lost
Republicans lost the Senate races in the south not because the realignment of the past two decades was reversed, but because the parallel effort to enfranchise southern blacks has been exceptionally successful. The CBS exit poll of southern Senate races found whites voting 61% to 38% for Denton in Alabama, 59% to 39% for Mattingly in Georgia, 60% to 39% for Moore in Louisiana, and 56% to 42% for Broyhill in North Carolina. In the gubernatorial races they voted 68% to 30% for Hunt in Alabama, 55% to 43% for Martinez in Florida, and 58% to 39% for Clement in Texas. In 1986, blacks-lopsidedly Democratic-turned out at a high enough rate to overcome the Republican advantage among whites. Table 12 summarizes the data and illustrates the structure which yielded the 1986 results and which is likely to handicap future Republican statewide candidates in the south. The first column reports the share of the electorate that was black, the next two report their vote. The last column is particularly significant because it indicates the size of the handicap with which Republicans begin every election in these states because of the Democratic loyalty of blacks. Consider Louisiana, where the Democratic advantage was greatest in 1986: black voters elected John Breaux. Given the overwhelmingly Democratic commitment of blacks, Breaux effectively had almost half of a winning vote before the polls opened (25% of the total vote was blacks voting for Breaux). To win, Henson Moore had to hold the non-black vote for Breaux to about 34%. The 39% of the white vote that Breaux actually achieved was more than he needed to win. Louisiana is not unique. Denton started 19 points behind in Alabama, Mattingly began 18 points behind in Georgia. None was able to overcome these deficits because the electorate was not so polarized that whites were prepared to vote Republican as heavily as blacks voted Democrat.
Rules of Thumb for Southern Republicans
In the future, in the absence of a racial polarization in the vote and in the presence of similar black-white turnout rates, Republican statewide candidates will be severely handicapped whenever the black population
